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Abstract
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm de-
sign have proposed collecting and aggregating
individual stakeholder preferences to create algo-
rithmic systems that account for those stakehold-
ers’ values. Using algorithmic student assignment
as a case study, we argue that optimizing for indi-
vidual preference satisfaction in the distribution
of limited resources may actually inhibit progress
towards social and distributive justice. Individual
preferences can be a useful signal but should be
expanded to support more expressive and inclu-
sive forms of democratic participation.
Machine learning is increasingly used in high-stakes situa-
tions such as access to education, employment, and health-
care (Ghassemi et al., 2019; Raghavan & Barocas, 2019).
Documented instances of discrimination, e.g. (Buolamwini
& Gebru, 2018; Obermeyer & Mullainathan, 2019; Choulde-
chova, 2017), have led to mounting pressures to improve
these systems by accounting for stakeholder values and con-
text in their design and use. One proposed way to do so
is to incorporate individual preferences into algorithmic
decision-making. Some emerging1 methods for participa-
tory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggre-
gating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorith-
mic systems that represent the values and goals of those
stakeholders (Lee et al., 2019; Kahng et al., 2019; Wang
et al., 2020; Noothigattu et al., 2018).
While these approaches offer some channels for stakehold-
ers to provide input, in this paper we argue that individual
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1This relatively new approach in machine learning builds on a
substantial body of work in social choice theory and economics that
seeks to understand how individual preferences can be aggregated
to inform decisions on behalf of a group. (Kenneth J. Arrow, 2010)
provides an overview.
preference aggregation is insufficient to support participa-
tory, democratic governance of algorithmic systems. We
examine the student assignment algorithm2 in San Francisco
Unified School District (SFUSD) as a case study. Incoming
students in San Francisco submit a ranked list of schools
they would like to attend, and the assignment algorithm
matches students to schools in a way that optimally satis-
fies the students’ preferences (SFUSD Office of Education,
2010). In practice, the algorithm has not lived up to its
theoretical promises of transparency, efficiency, and fair-
ness (Abdulkadirolu & Snmez, 2003). In fact, it is difficult
for families to navigate and has exacerbated segregation,
with students from historically marginalized backgrounds
concentrated in under-served schools (Haney et al., 2018).
For these reasons the school district voted to stop using and
completely redesign the system in 2018. Based on this case
study, we problematize three assumptions that are implicit
in preference-based algorithmic systems more broadly: (1)
that each individual has some inherent, fixed preferences
over the available set of alternatives; (2) that these prefer-
ences fully encapsulate each individual’s relevant values,
needs, and goals; and (3) that some aggregation of these
preferences reflects what is best for the group collectively.
This case study demonstrates that reporting preferences over
a fixed set of alternatives is an insufficient and unequal way
to give stakeholders a voice in algorithmic decision-making.
Instead, preferences often reflect existing social biases and
inequities and, for this reason, we should not assume that
an aggregation of those preferences will promote equity and
justice. Individual preferences can be a useful signal, but
must be expanded to include more expressive and context-
aware forms of democratic participation. For example, stu-
dent assignment systems could support alternative formats
for expressing priorities, provide more avenues to express
preferences, or facilitate public discourse and deliberation
regarding desirable social outcomes and relevant design
decisions given technical and resource constraints.
2While this is not a machine learning algorithm, the widespread
adoption of matching algorithms for student assignment over a
number of years makes them a useful case study for understanding
the implications of preference-based algorithmic systems more
broadly.
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1. Algorithmic Student Assignment
In most public school districts, students are assigned to
schools based on where they live. As a result, racial segre-
gation and economic inequalities are reflected in segregated
and unequal schools. Increasingly, school districts have
been introducing school choice systems that allow students
to apply to schools across the district. Students submit a
ranked list of schools they would like to attend and the dis-
trict uses an algorithm to match students to schools based
on those preferences. These policies have been met with
great excitement for their ability to advance equitable access
to high quality education, create more diverse classrooms,
and provide flexibility to families (Kasman & Valant, 2019).
New York City was the first to introduce a matching-based
assignment system for high schools in 2003, and many
school districts across the country have followed suit in the
decades since (Roth, 2015).
A number of matching algorithms have been developed by
economists in the field of market design to find an optimal
matching in a two-sided market based on each side’s prefer-
ences (Gale & Shapley, 1962; Shapley & Scarf, 1974). In
student assignment, the two sides of the market are the in-
coming students and available seats in the schools. Students
report their preferences by ranking the schools, and schools
can define priority categories for students, such as priority
for younger siblings of continuing students or priority for
students living in the school’s surrounding neighborhood.
The matching algorithms used in the student assignment con-
text3 are student-optimal in the sense that they are optimized
to satisfy student preferences as efficiently as possible,4 sub-
ject to each school’s capacity constraints (Abdulkadirolu &
Snmez, 2003). School priorities only determine the order
in which students are offered over-demanded seats, with
ties between students with the same priority resolved by a
random lottery.
1.1. San Francisco Unified School District
San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) introduced
a student assignment system based on a matching algo-
rithm5 in 2011 in the hopes of promoting equitable access
to educational opportunity and diverse classrooms (SFUSD
Office of Education, 2010). However, by 2018 the Board
had voted to redesign the system in response to widespread
3Deferred Acceptance (Gale & Shapley, 1962) and Top-
Trading Cycles (Shapley & Scarf, 1974) are commonly used for
student assignment (Abdulkadirolu & Snmez, 2003).
4For more details about properties of matching mechanisms
and matchings, such as strategy-proofness, and trade-offs between
stability and efficiency, see (Abdulkadirolu & Snmez, 2003). For
the purposes of this paper, it is most important to keep in mind
that the primary goal of these algorithms is to satisfy student
preferences.
5SFUSD appears to use Top-Trading Cycles.
dissatisfaction amongst families and clear evidence that the
system was not serving the district’s goals (Haney et al.,
2018). The district was especially concerned that the algo-
rithm had been unable to promote diverse classrooms and
equitable access to education, largely due to racial and so-
cioeconomic segregation in families’ preferences (SFUSD,
2019). As part of an ongoing project, we have conducted
an in-depth case study to understand why the promises of
market design have not been realized in SFUSD. For this
work we have conducted interviews with parents in San
Francisco and performed content analysis on policy docu-
ments by the school district that describe the goals of the
assignment algorithm. We use this system as a running ex-
ample to demonstrate some of the problems that arise when
using individual preferences to determine the distribution of
public resources.
2. What do I prefer?
Theoretical market design literature typically assumes that
each individual possesses some inherent preferences that
represent the relative value they would gain from each of
the available options. In practice, forming a preference list
is time-consuming for families and is strongly shaped by
social context.
Families invest heavily in information acquisition, often
seeking out more information than theoretical incentives
would predict (Chen, 2017). In interviews with San Fran-
cisco families, we found that researching schools is espe-
cially time-consuming and frustrating. Families have a
choice between all 72 elementary schools in the district and
they are able to rank as many as they would like in their pref-
erence list. Many parents attend multiple in-person school
tours and struggle to navigate fragmented and disorganized
online resources. As a result, families require significant
time and resources to fully understand the available options.
Since preferences are formed through a situated, ad hoc
process of information gathering, they reflect and replicate
implicit biases and social context, rather than an objective
measure of each school’s value to the family. Experimental
studies of advice sharing in the context of student assign-
ment have revealed that information sharing in social net-
works strongly influences whether individuals truthfully re-
port their preferences or engage in strategic behavior (Ding
& Schotter, 2017; 2019). In San Francisco, we found that
parents frequently consult other parents in their network
for information about schools, both online and in person.
White, economically advantaged parents acknowledged a
strong preference amongst their peers for a small subset of
the available schools that are perceived as the “best.” Con-
sistent with previous findings (e.g., (Johnson & Shapiro,
2003)), these schools are often also those with more white,
economically advantaged students (Collins, 2016).
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Systems that over-emphasize reported preferences as a form
of participation risk essentializing these preferences as an
objective, true representation of an individual’s values and
goals. Despite struggling to form their preference lists in the
first place, many parents we spoke to staunchly defended
their ultimate list as the best reflection of their child’s inter-
ests. Forms of participation that encourage stakeholders to
essentialize and rationalize their own views risk legitimiz-
ing damaging biases and stereotypes, and making trade-offs
between stakeholders’ interests increasingly difficult. For
example, SFUSD’s efforts to broaden access to education
have faced push-back from advantaged families who are
intent on sending their child to a heavily over-demanded
school (Collins, 2016).
3. What if I don’t like any of the choices?
Matching algorithms for student assignment also implicitly
assume that preferences provide all relevant information
about those families’ values and needs pertaining to school
choice. On the contrary, we argue that preferences can only
represent a subset of families’ possible values and needs,
and furthermore that preferences are a more expressive form
of participation for those who have historically benefited
more from and had more control over the education system.
In many contentious policy domains like student assign-
ment, the set of alternatives that individuals can rank has
been shaped by structures of power and inequality. By allow-
ing students to apply to any school in the district, SFUSD
appears to offer equal access to educational opportunities,
but the same set of alternatives does not offer identical op-
portunities to all students. Most families want a school
that is close to home and that will provide their child with
a high-quality education (Burgess et al., 2015). However,
prior studies have shown that families with more resources
are able to more heavily prioritize academic factors, while
other families may be constrained in their choice of schools
by economic and social factors (Laverde, 2020; Hastings
& Staiger, 2009). Similar patterns of access exist in San
Francisco. Through interviews, we found that a lack of
school bus routes constrains the available schools for par-
ents who do not have access to a car or time to commute with
their child. Further, the African American Parent Advisory
Council (AAPAC) has pointed out that African American
students in San Francisco continue to face racism and biases
in racially diverse classrooms (African American Parent
Advisory Council, 2017). The literature on matching algo-
rithms focuses on efficiently satisfying preferences without
acknowledging the ways in which this emphasis disempow-
ers those who cannot or do not want to attend the schools
that are currently more well-funded and provide more op-
portunities (Scott, 2013).
There are various policy approaches to educational equity
that are not based on school choice or student assignment,
but preferences provide a very limited avenue for families
to advocate for these types of reforms. For example, the
AAPAC has criticized the SFUSD system for pushing under-
served students out of their communities in order to access
high quality schools. They have called on SFUSD to create
high quality programs in low-resource neighborhoods and
protect local students access to these programs. Since sub-
mitting preferences is the only way many parents interact
with the enrollment system and communicate their needs
to the district, support for these demands may not be fully
received. Even when other avenues for participation are
available, forming preferences is already extremely time-
consuming and many families may not have the time and
resources to engage further with the district.
4. What do we prefer?
The limitations of preferences explored in the previous two
sections are exacerbated when preferences are aggregated
to make decisions that impact a group. Assigning students
to public schools determines which children are given ac-
cess to a well-funded, high-quality education, making ques-
tions of distributive justice extremely relevant. Principles
of distributive justice concern how a group should allocate
limited resources among members with competing needs
(Roemer, 1996). Preference aggregation procedures assume
that the ideal distribution is the one in which every indi-
vidual receives their first choice. For student assignment,
capacity constraints and uneven demand usually make this
ideal outcome impractical, but trade-offs are made to satisfy
preferences as efficiently as possible. Economist Zo Hitzig
argues that matching algorithms’ emphasis on efficiently
satisfying students’ preferences assumes an equality of op-
portunity principle of distributive justice, which may or may
not align with the community or school districts notions
of justice (Hitzig, 2019). For example, equitable access to
education and diverse classrooms have been central goals in
SFUSD for over forty years (SFUSD, 2015). However, even
if the district were able to assign every student to their first
choice school, schools would remain heavily racially and
economically segregated, with students from low-income
and historically marginalized backgrounds concentrated in
under-served schools (Haney et al., 2018).
Further, the only way to give additional advantages to a
student within the constraints of the matching algorithm is
by increasing their chances of receiving their first choice
assignment. SFUSD does give priority in their assignment
system to students who live in neighborhoods with the low-
est performing schools (SFUSD Office of Education, 2010).
While this has allowed the majority of eligible students to
attend their first choice school, many of these students con-
tinue to enroll in under-served schools (Haney et al., 2018).
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As we discussed in the previous section, even though all
students can theoretically apply to any school, not all stu-
dents can or want to attend the highest performing schools
for various social and economic reasons. Therefore, equal-
ity of opportunity only exists on a surface level and is not
actually achieved in practice. As a result, priority admission
turns out to be a very limited avenue to promote educational
equity.
Explaining the ways in which artifacts contain political
properties, Langdon Winner warned of “the all too common
signs of the adaptation of human ends to technical means”
(Winner, 1980). Preference aggregation procedures con-
strain human ends to their technical means in two respects.
First, participation is limited to submitting preferences in
whatever form the system accepts. As we have established,
certain forms of preference elicitation may be particularly
subject to social biases and stereotypes or may offer unequal
opportunities for families to express their needs. Second,
social outcomes are limited to this procedure’s range of
outputs given the submitted preferences. When the prefer-
ences provided as input to such a procedure reflect social
biases and inequities, we should not expect the aggregation
of those preferences to promote equity. Therefore, we must
consider ways of expanding participation in algorithmic
decision-making.
5. Participation beyond preferences
The limitations of preferences that we have identified do
not imply that preferences are a useless or dangerous form
of participation in every context. Eliciting and aggregating
stakeholder preferences can be useful for building commu-
nity trust and buy-in when stakeholders have relatively equal
power and access to resources (Lee et al., 2019). The student
assignment context highlights the limitations of preference
elicitation because the socio-political context is extremely
complex, power imbalances exist among participants, and
the stakes for each participant are very high.
One useful way to understand the strengths and weaknesses
of preferences as a form of democratic participation is by
considering the ways in which preferences offer stakehold-
ers a form of voice6 in governing algorithmic systems. In
student assignment, ranked preference lists are a coarse, sub-
jective, and incomplete representation of families’ values
and needs. Families can express their relative preferences
6We conceive of voice in the sense of Hirschman’s theory of
Exit, Loyalty and Voice (Hirschman, 1972). When members of
an organization are dissatisfied, they can choose to express their
views to drive change (Voice), passively wait for improvements
(Loyalty), or leave the organization altogether (Exit). Submitting a
ranked list of schools offers some degree of voice because families
can tell the district which schools they prefer, although they cannot
explain why. They are forced to be loyal to the existing schools and
only privileged families have an exit option (e.g. private school).
between schools, but this requires researching those schools
and families are constrained to choosing among existing
schools. In this way, preferences are especially limiting for
those who have fewer resources for research and for those
who gain relatively less value from the existing options.
These problems call for more expressive and accessible
forms of participation. For example, student assignment
systems could be expanded to support:
• Alternative formats for expressing preferences:
Rather than explicitly ranking schools, families might
report their weighted priorities over school factors,
such as proximity to their home or language programs.
It might be possible to choose school factors in a way
that minimizes the extent to which priorities reflect
stereotypes and biases.
• More opportunities to express preferences: In
addition to expressing preferences over the output
of a system, stakeholders could also submit their
preferences over its parameters, as in (Lee et al., 2019).
For example, families could provide input on the order
of priority categories, like sibling or neighborhood
priority.
• Public discourse and deliberation: Matching algo-
rithms are designed so that each individual can report
their self-interested preferences without worrying
about others’. More meaningful engagement in
deliberation and discourse may allow families to more
deeply understand each others’ needs and address
conflicts. Changes to the system’s design should also
be informed and shaped by community deliberation.
For instance, if families were to submit weighted
priorities over school factors rather than ranking
schools, community deliberation would be crucial to
determining which school factors are available.
Expanding participation in the design and governance of al-
gorithmic policy will require developing tools and infrastruc-
ture to support informed deliberation. In SFUSD, technical
decision-support tools have proven instrumental in policy-
making. In 2014, Matt Kasman, then a doctoral candidate at
Stanford, presented simulations to district decision-makers
showing that a change to the order of the priority categories
would inhibit progress towards equitable access to education
(SFUSD, 2015). These results influenced policymakers to
reject a proposal to give local students higher priority than
those in underserved neighborhoods. This example demon-
strates the potential for technical tools to support informed
policy-making, but significant further work is needed to
expand these tools to enable other stakeholders, such as
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families, to guide analyses, interpret results and deliberate
decisions. This will require making relevant information
publicly accessible, developing a common language for
participants to communicate about technical possibilities
and constraints, and conveying how changes to the system
might affect outcomes of interest. Opportunities for partici-
pation should particularly provide a low-cost platform for
marginalized community members to engage. This could
mean minimizing the time required to participate, and ad-
dressing participation barriers such as transportation and
childcare.
Student assignment is likely to remain a contentious domain,
even with successful efforts to broaden participation. Richer
forms of participation should recognize and accommodate
conflicts, with awareness of and sensitivity to historical pat-
terns of power and exclusion (Fraser, 1990; Mouffe, 1999).
Crawford has warned of the danger of understanding algo-
rithmic logics as autocratic (Crawford, 2016). SFUSD’s
student assignment algorithm shows that even apparently
democratic forms of participation can result in autocratic
algorithmic decision-making in which it can be difficult to
intervene when problems arise. Ascribing too much signif-
icance to individual preferences has created only a facade
of democracy while limiting stakeholders’ ability to contest
algorithmic logics, challenge existing inequities, and build
better futures.
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